Late January, 1901. The Australian Commonwealth parliament sits for the first, historic sitting of a brand new national government, having combined the formerly separate Australian colonies.
The first significant legislation passed by the new parliament was an act which severely limited immigration. It was the founding cornerstone of the White Australia policy, in which both right and left wing parties were united in a desire to achieve two strategic goals:
- Create an egalitarian, socially cohesive society in which the working man would have a good standard of living;
- Maintain Australia as an ethnically and culturally British country, loyal to Britain and creating an outpost of British culture. These two strategic goals were seen as intertwined, in so far that non-British -in particular, Asian- immigration was seen to be a direct threat to the success of a prosperous and cohesive society. Rather than fear-mongering, it had been a direct result of the experience of colonial-era Chinese immigration during the Victorian gold rush, in which severe ethnic tensions and the downward pressure on wages remained a cultural specter for many Australians.
As a result, trade unions, protectionist and free trade parties were all agreed on the inseparability of immigration volume and origins, and the feasibility of a socially mobile, prosperous society. Despite pressure from the Foreign Office, Australian legislators devised a system that effectively terminated non-European migration for some 70 years.
The Australian experiment worked. By the 1960s, Australia had become a peaceful and prosperous country. Despite Irish-English tensions, the country had pulled through the First World War. It had industrialized, halted and reversed Japanese expansionism in the Pacific, and created a cohesive and well-educated state — by 1969, producing [several] Nobel Laureates. The British class system was not transplanted, and a broad consensus had been forged that the country would benefit from accessible public health and education. Before the Second World War, non-British migrants were primarily Dutch or German and quickly assimilated.
Why does this matter? The Australian experience is relevant because of the inconvenient fact that non-European migrants to the West, on average, are beneficiaries, rather than contributors, to the social welfare systems of the West. It is a significant element of cognitive dissonance on the modern Western Left that, perhaps due to their economic illiteracy, they cannot foresee that unrestrained mass migration will destroy their cherished welfare state. The USA cannot support a 75% non-white population, given that the vast majority of organic population growth and immigration are from groups who are net beneficiaries by a large margin. Welfare programmes in the USA now account for [60%] of the Federal budget.
The unsustainability of the current situation is apparent to a quiet fringe of the modern Left, but the question is whether the religion of 'muh diversity' is stronger than the dream of 'muh welfare state'. The Australian Left, for the first 70 years of the Commonwealth's existence, understood this connection and put labor conditions and social cohesion ahead of any fanciful ideas of social justice or global egalitarianism. However, it is unclear if this argument is convincing to the modern Left: in short, is a nationalist Left possible?
This implies two questions: firstly, are workers in the West able to see that mass migration reduces working conditions and endangers the welfare state? I would argue that they are and that despite years of attempted indoctrination, they can see for themselves at ground level the results of these policies. This partly explains Le Pen, Trump, and Brexit: an element in common with each is the despair of white working class regions that feel ignored by the left wing parties that historically championed their grievances. In this respect, Le Pen and Rassemblement Nationale are better examples, as her platform is hardly right-wing, being largely statist and protectionist; in fact, it arises from a conservative desire to protect the left wing social-labor compact that has reigned in France for decades. Therefore, I believe it is feasible that the white working class would vote for a nationalist Left party. They have been abandoned by the traditional left parties, who are heavily embroiled in ethnic, sexual and globalist virtue games.
The key issue is therefore whether a new political party is required or the existing left-wing parties could be taken over by nationalist leaders. Given the two-party stranglehold in the USA, I believe it is impossible to imagine a nationalist contingent assuming power in the Democratic Party. It is too far gone; they are too committed to demographic change. It would appear that future Republican candidates must, therefore, see what those before Trump could not see: even left-leaning white working class men and women will vote Republican if they feel that the party is listening to them and will take the measures necessary to protect them. The parties are therefore evolving along ethnic lines; I cannot see that the Democrats would ever scale back on decades of diversity sermons. However, this represents an opportunity for the Republicans, who by softening their stance on the welfare state, may win undecided voters.
The trend of right-wing parties stealing working class votes is also true of the Liberal-National coalition in Australia, which managed in the 1990s to tear off a sizable portion of the working class from the Labor Party. They did not, however, suffer from the uniquely toxic legacy that the Conservative Party in the UK suffers from as a result of Thatcher's reforms. This explains why the Conservative Party has never been able to make much progress in scooping up working class votes. UKIP made some effort to "triangulate" this issue but appears to have been seen as a non-serious, single-issue, fringe party, at best able to win over a few pensioners who wish to vote for a more genuinely conservative party.